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Constitutional Law:
Crisis Government Becomes the Norm
ARTHUR S. MILLER*
There can be little doubt that humanity is on the verge of a
profound social transformation, at the edge of a new social
frontier.
1. INTRODUCTION
Any forecast of the direction American constitutional law will take
must perforce be based on a view of the type of society, national and
planetary, in which the Document of 1787 and its 26 amendments will
operate as this nation's fundamental law. Both predictions-of law and of
society-are risky, but necessary. The time is past when lawyers can fly
backwards to see what has happened. Law must be avowedly
instrumental, for America has assumed the task not only of saying what
the law is, but what it ought to be. The themes of this essay are multiple:
(a) law, including constitutional law, reflects society; it is, in brief, the
zeitgeist rather than "the law" that guides constitutional change;2
(b) change will remain a constant in the social order, as the scientific-
technological revolution continues its dizzy, uncharted pace; and (c) the
United States has entered a time when crisis will become the norm. In
what follows, those themes will be developed in the context of several
constitutional relationships: (a) changes within the separation of powers
in the national government; (b) alterations in federalism; (c) adaptation
of the Constitution to life on Spaceship Earth; (d) recognition of the
dimension of private governance; and (e) the desuetude of the individual
as the basic unit of American society.
Those are indeed large matters; each can be dealt with only summarily
in this brief essay. Much has had to be left out, not only in analysis of the
five categories just mentioned, but also with regard to specific doctrines.'
It is difficult, and no doubt rash, to peer into the future. At best, the future
is a shore dimly seen; at worst, it can, because of developments not now
known or foreseeable, be wholly different from what one envisages.4 Even
so, there seems to be a growing realization, not yet a consensus, that
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Homo sapiens is in for a continuing time of troubles.5 Lord Ashby of
Brandon believes that we are not merely in a crisis but a "climacteric. ' ,6 If
so, that is something new under the constitutional sun. I agree with him,
but do not welcome what seems sure to come. We have, however, to accept
life and the world as they are, not as we wish them to be. Only harm will
come from refusing to confront and attempt to deal with the coalescing
troubles-the "vulnerabilities"7 -of man kind. My main thesis, then, is
that crisis government will soon become the norm, not only in the United
States but also worldwide; and that will place unprecedented strains on the
American constitutional order. Whether it will survive in anything like its
present form-the Constitution's original texts, plus almost two centuries
of gloss-is not at all likely. It is probable, as Arnold Toynbee has said,
that increasingly despotic governments will develop as economic growth
slows and population expands. "In all developed countries," he said in
1975, "a new way of life-a severely regimented way-will have to be
imposed by a ruthless authoritarian government."8
In 1974, Senators Frank Church and Charles Mathias asserted that
"semergency government has become the norm."9 Thereis no way to prove
such a contrafactual proposition. Only time will give the answer. One
believes it or one does not; to me the overwhelming weight of thoughtful
opinion and the likelihood of being correct is on the side of theToynbees t°
and Browns" and Commoners 12 of the nation, rather than the Kahns.1
3
5. See E. CORNISH, THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE (1977) for an outline ofthe thinking ofthose m ho
have given serious attention to studying the future.
6. Lord Ashby, A Second Look at Doom, The 21st Fawley Lecture delivered at Southampton
University (Dec. 11, 1975) (photocopy of typed text). See E. AsHIBY, RECONCILING MAN WITH TIlE
ENVIRONMENT (1978); M. SHANKS, WHAT'S WRONG WITI TIlE MODERN WORLD? AGENDA FORA NEw
SocIETY(1978). See also W. HARMAN, AN INCOMPLETE GUIDE TO THE FUTURE xi (1976):
The world is headed for a climacteric which may well be one of the most fateful in the history
of civilizations. This convulsion is now not far off and most people sense something of it-
although interpretations vary widely, like the well-known interpretations of the elephant by
blindfolded people who feel different parts of the animal.
7. The term comes from H. BROWN, THE HUMAN FUTURE REVIStTED 179-218 (1978). He lists
thermonuclear war, energy shortages, dependence on nonfuel minerals, food, social disruption.
terrorism, and economic disruptions (such as inflation) as the vulnerabilities of an industrial nation.
In sum: "Industrial man now lives in a complex and largely synthetic ecological system, new in the
human experience and inadequately understood." Id. at 227.
8. Quoted in Takaski Oka, A Crowded World: Can Mankind Survive in Freedom?, Christ. Si.
Mon., Feb. 10, 1975, at 5, col. I [herinafter cited as Toynbee].
9. CHURCH & MATHIAS, FOREWORD TO A BRIEF HISTORY OF EMERGENCY POWERS IN TIlE
UNITED STATES, A WORKING PAPER PREPARED FOR TiE SPECIAL. COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
EMERGENCIES AND DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS UNITED STATES SENATE, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. at v
(1974).
10. Toynbee, supra note 8.
11. L. BROWN, supra note 1; H. BROWN, supra note 7.
12. B. COMMONER, THE POVERTY OF POWER (1975).
13. Herman Kahn is perhaps the leading exponent of the view that the future Vill be rosy. See,
e.g., H. KAHN, W. BROWN & L. MARTEL, THE NExT 200 YEARS: A SCENARIO FOR AMERICA AND TIlE
WORLD (1976). See also R. MILES, AWAKENING FROM THE AMERICAN DRE.A'i-TiIE SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL LIMITS TO GROWTH (1976). A useful selected bibliography of future-oriented books may be
found in E. CORNISH, supra note 5, at 259-82.
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Even if the proposition is not accurate in detail, it surely is in general
terms. That is as much as one can essay at this time.
The Constitution is predicated on the assumption that crisis is
aberrational. No provision is expressly made for emergency govern-
ment; 14 but since the beginnings of the Republic, actions have been taken
to deal with emergencies, actual or perceived.15 In all that time, the theory
was that the Constitution remained the same. Conditions could change,
as Chief Justice Hughes said in the Blaisdell case, 16 which would enable
extraordinary actions to be taken. But the Supreme Court has always
adhered, without overt deviation, to the principles announced by Justice
Davis in Ex parte Milligan:?7 "The Constitution is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with its shield of its
protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances."
That is a nice sentiment, were it true; but it is not-not only in the past, but
also in the present and surely in the future.
II. TRENDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Law school study of constitutional law employs, speaking generally,
the case method, with the case being defined as a Supreme Court opinion.
Scholarship tends to be patient analyses of the intricacies of the reasoning,
or lack of it, in given opinions. Well and good, so far as it goes; the trouble
is that it does not go nearly far enough. Required is attention accorded to
the Constitution "in operation" as well as the Constitution "of the
books"; 8 and further, to the trends of structural development in the
government brought into being by the Document of 1787. The present
essay is concerned with several structural trends, rather than with specific
constitutional doctrines.
A. Separation of Powers
That power in the American constitutional order has always flowed,
albeit at times discontinuously, toward the Executive is a truism. That it
will continue to do so may be predicted with confidence. However much
Congress, in the wake of Watergate and the resignation of Richard Nixon,
is trying to retrieve ceded powers or gain new ones, by no means can it do
so. In 1967, a perceptive French observer dismissed the power of modern
legislatures as an "illusion," maintaining that "the organs of representative
14. Save, perhaps, in the habeas corpus and declaration of war clauses. Some nations. notably
France, with written constititutions do make express provision for emergencies, See M. Voissir.
L'ARTICLE 16 DE LA CONSTITUTION Du4 OCTOBRE 1958 (1969). To date, Article 16 has been employed
once, by President Charles de Gaulle, in the Algerian crisis in 1961. Id. at 414-15.
15. See A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWtRw TiHE ORIGINS (1976);
A. MILLER, PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A NUTSHELL (1977).
16. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
17. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-1 (1866).
18. W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 10 (1885).
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democracy no longer have any other purpose than to endorse decisions
prepared by experts and pressure groups."' 9 The problems of governance
are too many and too complex for two committees, one of 100 persons and
the other of 435, to do much more than that. Efforts now being made to
impose "Congressional vetoes" on specific actions of the public
administration are by no means sure to survive constitutional challenge.20
Members of Congress participate in the many "subgovernments" 2' of
Washington, but usually as individuals not as a collectivity.
Woodrow Wilson could write in 1885 that the chairmen of the
standing committees of Congress were the most powerful governmental
officials;22 but by 1908 he had changed his mind and clearly saw the rise of
executive hegemony in government.23 That trend has accelerated since
then. Wars and rumors of wars, economic depressions, deep and
irreversible immersion of the nation in world affairs, a monopoly of
expertise in the Executive Branch-all these, and more, are forces that
militate toward an even stronger President and bureaucracy. The
President is not merely primus inter pares in the tripartite division of
powers; he is primus. Period. Whoever lives in the White House, of
whatever party, will continue to be the focal point of attention-and of
actual governing power. The troubles of President Carter, so obvious in
1978, should not be taken as the norm.
Presidents will, to be sure, have to negotiate with Congress and with
the bureaucracy, which is a force in its own right. But there can be no
doubt that, in terms of formal authority as well as effective control, the
reins of government are in the hands of the man living at 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue, not in the hands of those who work on Capitol Hill.
No government of any consequence in the world is run otherwise. The
spare generalities of Article II do not begin to demonstrate the range and
nature of presidential power. Executive power, of course, has come
without amendment; it has both been seized by the Executive and
delegated to the public administration, including the President, by a
Congress only too willing to forego scrutiny of the myriad details of
routine problems of governance.
In recent years, the bureaucracy in Congress has greatly increased in
size and influence. Little doubt exists about the actual legislative powers of
the "third branch" of Congress-the oft-times nameless and faceless
individuals who serve on committee or Congressional staffs. It is literally
impossible for any one member of Congress to be privy to the details of the
19. J. ELLUL, THE POLITICAL ILLUSION (1967).
20. See, e.g., Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (CL CL 1977), cert. denied,434 U.S. 1009
(1978); Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 IND.
L. J. 367 (1977), and works cited therein.
21. See D. CATER, POWER IN WASHINGTON (1964).
22. W. WILsoN, supra note 18.
23. W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1908).
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many programs of government or even of the bills on which he votes. So
reliance is placed either on the leadership or, more likely, on staff
members. Nevertheless, as compared with the nearly three million
Executive Branch bureaucrats, Congress has no real chance to do more
than to play catch-up on a few details of government. Public policy
matters, large and small, ever more are settled with only perfunctory
legislative cognizance and participation. The most that Congress can
hope to do, and then not very often, is to make those in the Executive
Branch think twice before acting. The future, to repeat, belongs to the
Executive.
As with Congress, so too with the courts. Despite a flurry of activism
in the past three decades, government by judiciary (the title of a
remarkably silly book published in 1977)24 is mere fantasy. Judges simply
do not have the time or the power to do much more than erect standards
toward which they can hope the people and the politicians will aspire.
Judicial review of administrative action, for example, is noteworthy for its
rarity; when it does take place, the administrator is usually sustained. Of
the untold millions of administrative decisions made annually, what the
administrator decides is usually final in fact, though not in theory. So,
too, with the Supreme Court, which in fits of hyperbole has been described
as an extraordinarily powerful political actor.25 That simply is not true,
given the range and nature of decisions important to Americans, whether
as individuals or as members of groups. Lawyers and others like to think
otherwise, to be sure; but it is clear that the power of the Supreme Court
specifically, and of courts generally, is greatly overrated today, and that it
will be even more attenuated in the future.26 That is so despite United
States v. Nixon2 and the Steel Seizure Case.2  We should, furthermore,
always remember that constitutional interpretation is distinctly not a
judicial monopoly.
24. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
25. E.g., A. BERLE, POWER 342 (1969): "[A] revolution has taken place and is in progress" and
"the revolutionary committee is the Supreme Court of the United States"; Hutchins, The Case br
Constitutional Change, 3 CENTER REP. No. 5 (Dec. 1970) cited in Bozk Review, 71 COLtUM. L, Rixv,
502 n.4 (1971): "The Court has become 'the highest legislative body in the land.'"
I do not say that the Court has no power; of course it has some. My point is that it is far less than
that attributed to it by the conventional wisdom. See A. MILLER, TIlL SUPREMEI COURT. MYTIU AND
REALITY (1978).
26. "f[]t is not possible to avoid the conclusion that something quite fundamental has begun to
go wrong with Western civilisation." E. MISHAN, TlE ECONOMIC GROWTII DEIBATI: AN ASSSiSMI NI
265 (1977). If that be so, and I think it is, I am unable to perceive how lawyer-judges sitting on courts
will be of much use in trying to extricate Homo sapiens from the predicament the species is in, The law
schools have not yet come to grips with that situation; study of law, including constitutional law, tends
to be based on concepts long since dead or moribund.
27. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
28. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The limitations on the
Executive are political rather than judicial. It is only by an intellectually indefensible fiction that the
powers of the President can be deduced from the spare generalities and the silences of Article II. See
A. MILLER, supra note 2.
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In the past, during times of all-out emergency, such as declared war,
judges and legislators deferred to the Executive. So it will be in the
future-perhaps in the remainder of this century and surely in the2lst. The
coalescing problems of the climacteric of mankind will not permit the
stately ritual of judicial decision-making or the pulls and tugs of the
legislative process. Events will move too fast for that. This is not to say
that the Executive will be efficient, merely that that branch will be
dominant.
B. Federalism
Federalism was the price paid for the Constitution of 1787, which
established, in Corwin's terminology, a system of "dual federalism."2 9 That
system has long been moribund: The allegedly sovereign states are more a
source of Senators and of presidential candidates than they are
repositories of actual governing power. Problems are national or
planetary, and have been since at least the promulgation of the sixteenth
amendment. A nation with a central income tax cannot be truly federal, in
the sense of dual powers between central and local governments.
Economic planning, furthermore, is the scourge of original federalism;
splintered, autonomous decision-making cannot be brooked, whether
under planning by the "first economy" of the giant corporations or by
public government itself.30 Not that planning by government has gone very
far; it has not. There can be little doubt, however, that it will quickly
develop.
This means that some type of incomes policy and the imposition of
wage and price controls are probable-in the near, rather than the far
distant, future. At the very least. A consensus is now being formed in the
United States that can only lead to economic planning on a grand scale.
When it occurs, as it will, the Constitution will be able to tolerate it. There
is enough room in the interstices of the affirmative powers in Article I to
make that certain. The courts will not impose any barriers. States, then,
will ever more become administrative districts for centrally promulgated
policies. These policies, be it noted, are established today both by the
private governments of the giant corporations and in the rapidly increasing
programs of the federal government.3'
A further meaning is clear, but not likely to get any serious attention:
there is no need whatsoever for fifty-one political districts (the states plus
the District of Columbia); that decentralized political order makes no
sense when laid against the realities of power in the present and emergent
constitutional order. One example will suffice to evidence the point: when
29. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1(1950).
30. See A. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS A\D THIE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1976).
31. Id.
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in recent years New York City got into financial straits, it did not try to
solve its own problems and did not even seriously try to get the state
government in Albany to extricate it from near bankruptcy. Quite the
contrary: the eyes of New York, city and state, swung covetously toward
Uncle Deep Pockets in Washington. What useful purpose, in such a
circumstance, is served by the cost of running a state government in New
York? Examples could be multiplied, but, heeding William of Occam,
will not be. The lesson is clear: traditional federalism is dying or may
already be dead. The problems of economics and the imperatives of
technology are simply too much for, say, Rhode Island or South Dakota,
let alone larger and wealthier states. They are even too much, as will be
discussed below, for the United States to act alone.
As population increases, as economic growth declines, as the nation
becomes even more deeply intertwined with others, that trend will
accelerate. Nothing in the Constitution will stop it. Nothing the
Supreme Court might do will stop it. We are superstitious and venerate
the written word of the fundamental law; but that is constitutional
fetishism. Some also venerate the past and the saints-the Founding
Fathers-in America's hagiology. The first amendment protects such
beliefs and the expression of them. There is nothing unconstitutional
about being an antiquarian. It merely does not comport with reality,
contemporaneous or futurist. Neither the present nor the future are mere
extensions of the past.
C. Planetary Interdependence
"It has seldom been more important," The Economist said in April
1978, " to gear national policies to fit international goals, rather than the
other way round. 32 Precisely. The problem for American constitution-
alism is the further adaptation of an essentially domestic fundamental law
to the realities of life on a shrinking planet. Science and technology have
diminished time and distance. The United States has an interest in
happenings anywhere in the world-and, indeed, far into outer space.
This, again, is something new under the constitutional sun.
Can those necesssary accommodations, which are sure to come-
have already come-be made without amendment? Professor Paul
Freund, peering into the future in 1956, maintained that "any really
thoroughgoing commitment to supranational authority would be brought
about by constitutional amendment, necessarily so if the measures of the
world union were to be established as the supreme law of the land secured
against change brought about by subsequent national legislation."" No
doubt that is true if, but only if, the change is a "thoroughgoing
commitment to supranational authority"; by no means is it likely that such
32. Moving the World Uphill, The Economist (London), April 29, 1978, at 89, col, I.
33. Freund, Law and the Future: Constitutional Law, 51 Nw. L. Rv. 187, 194-95 (1956).
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a revolutionary event will occur. Rather, barring catastrophe, changes
will come as they usually have come in the development of the
Constitution-incrementally. 34 American adherence to supranational-
ism will be built bit by bit, rather like the slow growth of a coral reef instead
of a mighty volcanic explosion. If so, then the Constitution as now
written can accommodate the accretive commitment to larger than
national resolutions of public policy problems. 3 Sooner or later, those
accretions will become in fact a "thoroughgoing commitment."
That development has already begun, and surely-absent a
catastrophe such as a nuclear war-will continue. The little known but
greatly important International Monetary Fund is one example. NATO
is another. International commodity agreements others. The list is not
long, but it is significant: There is a slow but steady trend toward less than a
planetary but more than a national confrontation and resolution of
common problems. No constitutional problems of any importance are
posed by that trend. Bit by bit sovereignty-that ostensibly indissoluble
attribute of nation-states-is being chipped away; slowly, the coral reef of
multinationalism grows.
The political development parallels, of course, the actions of
businessmen. No American corporation of any consequence is purely
domestic in its operations. 3 The multinational corporation has become a
familiar participant in the world arena. With the businessman goes the
lawyer; many American law firms now have branches in other countries,
sometimes many branches. The late Stephen Hymer said:
[W]e seem to be in the midst of a major revolution in international
relationships as modem science establishes the technological basis for a
major advance in the conquest of the material world and the beginnings of
truly cosmopolitan production. Multinational corporations are in the
vanguard of this revolution, because of their great financial and ad-
ministrative strength and their close contact with the new technology.
37
Corporations often can shape the environment in which the problems of
American external relations grow and can also define the axiomatic in
public policy. An axiomatic decision is one that is almost automatic-
actions by government which are rarely accompanied by debate and do not
require any means-end calculation. It is axiomatic, for example, to
protect American property abroad. Where economics goes, politics
follows-and the Constitution is not far behind. The question is not
34. See C. LINDBLOM, THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS (1968).
35. Cf. A Lawfor Europe, The Economist (London), June 17, 1978, at 17, col. 1, suggesting that
it is "possible for the European court [of the Common market] to play the sort of role the Supreme
Court of the United States plays, pioneering political advances by the way it chooses to interpret the
Rome treaty."
36. See R. BARNET & R. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH (1974).
37. Hymer, The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development, in
ECONOMIcS AND WORLD ORDER: FROM THE 1970s TO THE 1990s (Bhagati cd. 1972).
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whether the Constitution follows the flag, as some have said, but whether
the decisions by governmental officers, indubitably valid under the
Constitution, serve to chip away at the foundations of American
sovereignty. The answer can only be yes-today and even more so in the
future.
No discussion of foreign affairs should avoid mention of the most
perilous of all crises: nuclear war and the proliferation of nuclear
capability. Of that, space permits only two statements. First, the
possibility-nay, probability-of nuclear war has "amended" the
Constitution by making the power to enter into war a presidential, not a
congressional, decision. Presidents-for example, Lyndon Johnson and
Richard Nixon-publicly assert a power in the President to use lesser
violence without regard to Congress.38 The Vietnam conflict is the classic
instance of that position. But there are others. Second, nuclear war will
mean that for the first time, save perhaps for the Civil War, violence will
have been "socialized" for Americans. All of us, particularly those in
metropolitan areas, are vulnerable, either to attack from another nation or
from some terrorist who succeeds in constructing a nuclear device.
In all of this the Constitution is irrelevant. Emergency is the
problem, and survival is the goal. Law of any type will not stand in the
way of attempted fulfillment of that most fundamental of all the aims of
any society. "The possibility of all-out thermonuclear war," Dr. Harrison
Brown says, "is the most serious danger confronting industrial civilization
today. 3 9 Nothing in the Constitution or any other law will inhibit those
who govern us from trying to prevent that catastrophe; or if it happens,
doing what is necessary to cope with it.
D. Private Governance
More than thirty years ago Alexander Pekelis predicted that the next
generation of constitutional lawyers would be concerned with the
problems of private governments, by which he meant mainly the giant
corporations.40  He was echoed by Adolf Berle, among others. 4' They
38. President Johnson's views on his powers in Vietnam are quoted in G. GUNTIIItR. CAStS AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 442 (1975); for President Nixon's views, see Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Final
Report, Book IV at 157-58 (1976) (Nixon's answer to an interrogatory). President Ford held similar
views, as in the Mayaguez incident. See A. MILLER, supra note 15, at 192-94. Historically a1 similhl
pattern is visible. See L. FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS (1978); J, RANDALL,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (rev. ed. 1951).
39. H. BROWN, supra note 7, at 180.
40. Pekelis, Private Governments and the Federal Constitution, in LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION 91
(M. Knovitz ed. 1950).
41. The relevant citations may be found in Miller, The Corporation as a Private Governnent In
the World Community, 46 VA. L. REv. 1539 (1960).
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were only partially correct. The Supreme Court, which broke new ground
in Marsh v. Alabama,42 extended that decision in 1968;43 but with the
advent of the Nixon Court, that movement was aborted. Tanner44 and
Hudgens4 5 make it clear that the present Court is quite unwilling to equate
private power with public governance-and thus to extend the state action
principle to cover some of the pluralistic social groups of the nation.
Whether that doctrine of the Nixon Court will endure is the question.
Despite evidence to the contrary, the answer, in my judgment, is negative.
The time has come-indeed, it is long past-for the giant corporation
to be "constitutionalized.,,46  That this will be done-that Pekelis'
forecast will come true-seems reasonably sure. First, in such statutes as
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress in effect made private enterprises
subject to something akin to constitutional restraints. Equal opportunity
became a statutory right, upheld by the Supreme Court. There was less
need, then, to apply the fourteenth amendment to private corporations, for
they had come under the aegis of a congressional command. Second, the
Court in at least two 1978 decisions gave corporations the protections of
the first and fourth amendments.47 Those who receive such protection will
ultimately have to pay the price of an obligation to obey the Constitution
themselves. Finally, more and more people-for example, Professor
David Ewing of the Harvard Business Shoo148-are coming to perceive
the immense power of corporations and to argue that there should be an
employee's bill of rights. The giant corporation simply does not fit the
realities of orthodox constitutional theory and interpretation. "Constitu-
tionalizing" it is, therefore, an idea whose time has come. Despite the
present composition of the Supreme Court, the questions of arbitrary
treatment by private groups will not be easily quelled. The corporation is
a constitutional person (for diversity cases, it is a citizen) and should be
held to the view, as Justice Black put it in the Korematsu case,49 that
citizenship-personhood-has its duties as well as its rights.
, One could argue, as Justices Black50 and Douglas5' did, that the
corporation should be "depersonified." After all, it was not until 1886,
and then casually without hearing argument, that the Supreme Court
42. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
43. Food Employees Union, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
44. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
45. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
46. See A. MILLER, supra note 30; Miller, Toward "Constitutionali:ing" the Corporation: A
Speculative Essay, 80 W. VA. L. Rv. 187 (1978).
47. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307 (1978).
48. D. EWING, FREEDOM INSIDE THE ORGANIZATION (1977).
49. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding military curfew of persons of
Japanese ancestry even though many were native-born American citizens).
50. Connecticut Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting).
51. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562,579 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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endowed the corporation with the status of a constitutional person. 2 What
the Court has wrought it can take away; but in this instance it is not likely
to do so. Far more probable is the recognition of the dimension of private
governments, a development for which I have argued elsewhere.3 This,
after all, is truly an age of collective action. But if private governance is
recognized and indeed occurs, and the giant corporation is brought under
the ambit of the state-action concept, no one should think that individual
freedoms will suddenly take a jump. Some freedoms, yes, but for others
the answer is no.
E. The Individual in the Bureaucratic State
We live, as Professor James Wilson has argued, in the age of
54administration, at a time when the bureaucratic state has risen to a
position of great prominence and influence. That development has crucial
significance for the relationship of the individual qua individual vis-a-vis
the state. The natural person confronts bureaucracies wherever he turns.
With some exceptions, of course, he works in groups, socializes in groups,
and does almost everything except die (and sometimes even then) as a
member of a group.
That, too, is a fairly recent development, at least to the extent to which
it exists today. Yesteryear was different, but only in degree. The net
result is starkly clear: The individual spends his life as a member of groups
and is significant only as a member of groups. Whatever may have been
the original theory behind the Constitution, the United States is not
composed of atomistic individuals operating as such. As long go as 1927,
John Dewey maintained that
the human being whom we fasten upon as individualpar excellence is moved
and regulated by his association with others; what he does and what the
consequences of his behavior are, what his experience consists of, cannot even
be described, much less accounted for, in isolation.5
Political scientists since Arthur Bentley, writing in 1908,6 have
viewed the political process as the clash of conflicting groups. So, too,
with economists; Peter Drucker is an example: it is "the organization
rather than the individual which is productive in an industrial system."5 7
Lawyers have lagged behind, although the Supreme Court in recent years
has found a constitutional right of association in the delphic pronounce-
52. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); see Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting opinion in First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822 (1978) (Rehnqulst, J.,
dissenting).
53. A. MILLER, supra note 30.
54. Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, 41 THE PUB. INTEREST 77 (Fall 1975),
55. J. DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 188 (1927).
56. A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1908).
57. P. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY 6 (1950).
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ments of the first amendment.58  The "organizational revolution"-
Kenneth Boulding's term59-is slowly finding its way into constitutional
law.
This has large consequences. First, freedom under the Constitution
is ever increasingly becoming merely freedom of which group tojoin. Even
then, some groups limit membership. I have elsewhere argued that the
Supreme Court, albeit unwittingly, is putting Thomas Hill Green's view of
freedom in a social organization into the notion of individual liberty.'0 The
key case-the turning point-was West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.
6
'
When the Court legitimized congressional encouragement of group action
in the Jones & Laughlin case,62 the pattern became clear. NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson63 merely capped a previous development.
Individual liberty, in the second place, is subject to the constraints,
often arbitrary, of the group-rather, groups-in which the natural person
operates. This is best seen, perhaps, in the business corporation, where, as
noted above, the problem of individual rights in the working place is now
getting more attention. But it also appears, inter alia, in labor unions and
in private clubs. The individual is submerged into the overall well-being
of the group, as determined by those-usually an oligarchy-who control
it.
6 4
Third, an inability to join a group may result in severe deprivations.
For example, when a "whistle blower" is fired by a company (or
government agency), he finds it difficult to locate other employment.
Polygraph tests, imperfect though they are to determine a person's
integrity, are nonetheless widely used. With the increasing use of
computers and data processing, a person's record follows him wherever he
goes; and all too often he finds doors barred to him for reasons about
which he knows nothing.
Finally, the individual is powerless, or almost so, in trying to alter
group behavior, whether in a public or a private bureaucracy. Not always,
to be sure. On occasion the lone person can and does make a difference, 5
but only if he can use another group-e.g., Congress, the judiciary, or an
58. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See D. Faw.%tM,;, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION (1963).
59 K. BOULDING, THE ORGANIZATIONAL REVOLUTION (1953).
60. Miller, Toward A Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 199 (1968).
61. 300 U.S. 379(1937).
62. NLRBv.Jones&LaughlinSteelCo.,301 U.S. 1 (1937).
63. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The deeper meaning is that concept of "status" may now be seen, at least
in an emergent state, in constitutional law. The rights and liberties ofsome Americans, that is, depend
on the group to which they belong. The obvious example is military personnel; but many others exist.
Constitutional law scholarship has done little or nothing to note this important development. Butsee
R. HORN, GROUPS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1956); Phillips, Thomas Hill Green, Positive Freedom and
the United States Supreme Court, 25 EMORY L. J. 63 (1976).
64. The reference here is to Michels' "iron law of oligarchy." See R. MICHELs. POLITICAL
PARTIES (1911).
65. Ralph Nader is perhaps the best example.
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economic power group, such as a union-to help him in disputes with, say,
a private corporation or a governmental agency. The pattern, however, is
otherwise.
That the movement toward bureaucracy will both continue and
intensify cannot be seriously doubted. As population grows, as
technology continues its dizzy pace, as cities expand, as corporations
grow, as government becomes even larger, as emergencies occur, as they
will, the natural person will find that he faces a congeries of groups too
powerful to battle. The Constitution will not bar that continuing
development.
Paradoxically, at the very time that the nature of freedom has
changed (in the four decades since Parrish), there are more individual
freedoms of a certain type than ever before. Right now.-1979-the
individual is more protected by the Constitution and judicial (and other)
interpretation than at any previous time in American history. This is the
Golden Age of individual rights (of a certain type). The reasons for this
seeming paradox are not hard to locate. One is economic: Human
freedoms are more fully protected today because of the high growth rate in
the economy since the late 1930s. This means that the economic pie was
for about thirty-five years getting larger and that more people could get a
slice of it than ever before. Since necessitous men cannot be free men, that
means that the gross national product had a definite relationship to the
recent expansion of freedoms. However, economic growth has slowed
and may be stopping. If that continues, as I think it will, then more and
more people will be contesting for a relatively smaller pie. People will be
willing to forego other freedoms in order to obtain an adequate income. In
other words, the social basis of the recent expansion of freedoms appears
to be vanishing. (Even more portentous is the high probability of social
turmoil.) In the unlikely event that zero population growth is attained, it
will not be until far in the future; the number of Americans'will total at
least 300 million in the 21st century-a 50 percent increase over today.66
Of more importance, however, is the fact that individual freedoms are
permitted or tolerated by the state only when important interests of the
state are not jeopardized. Cohen v. California67 is an example; whether
Cohen would have prevailed at, say, the time that United States' v.
O'Brien was decided is far from self-evident. Why someone should be
able publicly to flaunt a "Fuck the Draft" slogan on his jacket while
another who burned his draft card in protest against Vietnam went to jail is
explainable, in my view, only because in Cohen the interests of the state at
that time were not jeopardized. In O'Brien, the interests of the state were
held to be significant because public opposition to Vietnam had not yet
hardened.
66. See6INTERcoM 3(1978).
67. 403U.S. 15(1971).
68. 391 U.S. 367(1968).
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This can, and should, be put in a different way; as Professor J. A. G.
Griffith said in his recent important book, The Politics of the Judiciary:
"[T]he judiciary in any modern industrial society, however composed,
under whatever economic system, is an essential part of the system of
government and . . . its function may be described as underpinning the
stability of that system from attack by resisting attempts to change it."6
9
The three years between O'Brien (1968) and Cohen (1971) should be
viewed as years in which the zeitgeist noticeably turned against the
Vietnam conflict. So Cohen got off; O'Brien deserved at least the same,
and probably more.
There is a larger, deeper meaning to what has been said. As more and
more economic controls are placed on the individual, by both public and
private governments, a subtle tradeoff is occurring. Freedom in personal
lifestyles is being permitted, but only when the stability of the system is not
threatened. That, it seems to me, is the probable reason for permitting
today what would once have been called obscene, for the decision in
Stanley v. Georgia,70 for permissiveness in cohabitation, for the probable
legalization of marijuana, for the widespread use of other narcotics
without punishment, for acceptance of other behavior patterns (e.g., nude
bathing). In none of these situations is the stability of the system placed in
even minimal jeopardy. Should any one of them do so, it may be said with
complete confidence that a crackdown will immediately take place-and
will be constitutionally valid.
The "tradeoff" may be likened to Aldous Huxley's soma pills?' The
people are kept quiescent by individual freedoms that mean something
only to the persons, not to "society" 72 at large or to the state. I am not
suggesting that this is a deliberate maneuver, conducted in a dark and
conspiratorial way. But, when coupled with the economic factor men-
tioned above, it does seem to be the most likely explanation of the present-
day expansion in individual liberties. Those liberties will continue to
grow until such time as they collide with the interests of the state. In
economic matters, that collision has already occurred; that will intensify in
the future. More "soma pills" will be permitted, as more controls are
applied. Whether those "pills" will suffice cannot be answered at this time.
In this connection, it is well to distinguish between authoritarian and
totalitarian governments. Under the former-Franco Spain is an
example-a considerable amount of personal freedoms (not important to
the state) are possible; but under totalitarianism-China, Albania, the
U.S.S.R.-total control is the rule. I think the United States will become
69. J. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY 213 (1977).
70. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
71. A. HuxLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932). See A. HuxLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REv ts1T
(1958).
72. The concept of society is one of the neglected areas of constitutional scholarship. Judges
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authoritarian in the future, but will be able to stave off totalitarianism for
some time.
III. CONCLUSION
We have come a long way, at a far too rapid and oversimplified pace.
Limitations of time and space did not permit more than conclusory
statements. Much has been left out-necessarily SO. 7 3 What has been
said, furthermore, is controversial. Many, perhaps most, people do not
like to think in "gloom and doom" terms. Neither do I. But the facts are
there, for those who are able and willing to see them. Dr. Harrison Brown
asserts:
Today we are children, but finally after a million or so years our childhood is
about to end. With the end of childhood three things can happen: we can
exterminate ourselves; we can go back to the ways of life of our ancestors; we
can make a quantum jump upward to a new level of civilization, undreamed
of by the philosophers of the past.
If he is correct, as I think he is, the final question is whether our
governmental institutions-our constitutional order-have the capacity
to cope quickly and effectively with the manifold problems of the last part
of the twentieth century.
The jury is really not still out on that question. Our obvious inability
to deal with both inflation and unemployment, with energy and nuclear
proliferation, to mention only a few current problems, does not give much
basis for hope. Some constitutional changes could be suggested-but
that's another essay. The editors of this Journal wisely asked the authors
of the symposium to limit themselves to approximately 5000 words. What
can be said is that there is enough play in the constitutional joints to enable
the political leaders of the nation to take almost any action they wish.
Whether they will do so is an entirely different question. That political
power is constitutionally permissible does not mean that it will be used. I
am not optimistic that the necessary adjustments in public policy will be
made. The American system of pluralism is not working. 7- A nation of
avowed pragmatists, who tend to pursue rather narrow, hedonistic goals,
is not going to change its ways by rational argument. What will change
and commentators often use the word, but without defining it; or in interest-balancing situations,
revealing how societal interests are identified and weighed. Legal writers, including judges, would
rather chop logic with appellate judges than think deeply about such matters.
73. One of the more important areas for scholarly consideratioi is the reconciliation of the
concepts of liberty and equality in constitutional interpretation. See R. DWORKIN, TAKINOmRIOirs
SERIOUSLY (1977). See also J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) and R. NoZICK, ANARCHY, Tl
STATE AND UTOPIA (1974'. I have paid little attention to the economic crisis. On this, see F. ALLVINU &
F. TARPLEY, JR., THE NEW STATE OF THE ECONOMY (1977). Many other areas need study.
74. H. BROWN, supra, note 7, at 249.
75. It does not give enough efficiency in government and it is not protecting individual liberties
sufficiently. See T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969). Pluralism works only when there is
common, albeit tacit, agreement on the ends of society. See Y. SIMON, PinlosoPI'Y or DLMOCRATlc
GOvERNMENT (1951). That is precisely the opposite of what is occurring today, See R. Moss, "Lll
COLLAPSE OF DEMOCRACY (1977).
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those ways is disaster, actual or imminent; predictions of disaster, includ-
ing this one, are not enough.
The United States has survived and prospered thus far, not because of
the Constitution but in spite of it. Only by extra-constitutional adjust-
ments to the original conception has government operated at all effective-
ly. The crucial problem now is how to make governmental power that is
necessary as tolerable and decent as possible. I have suggested else-
where,76 and repeat now, that this at the very least requires rethinking of
the concept of separation of powers. The urgent tasks of government
must be accomplished, but that power must also be accountable. As
matters now stand, we have little efficiency in government and not much
accountability. That, in sum, is the pressing constitutional problem of the
present and of the coming years.77
I return, finally, to Dr. Lester Brown's statement in the headnote to
this paper. The "profound social transformation" of which he speaks is
already occurring. One has to be at least a glandular optimist to believe
that better conditions will come from that transformation. Uncontrolled
change is the enemy. We are aboard a train running down the rails out of
control; there is no one in the engine cab and there may be demons at the
switches; most people, including almost all lawyers, are in the caboose
looking backwards.78 In such circumstances, to be an optimist one has to
be a pessimist. Not a cynic. Not sunk in despair. Merely fully aware of
the nature of the problem, with a determination to do something about
it.79 The challenge is obvious: Will it be met?
76. A. MILLER, PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A NUTSHELL (1977); Miller, Separation of Powers-
Does It Still Work?, 48 POL. Q. 77 (1977).
77. See Moynihan, Imperial Government, 65 COMMENTARY 25 (June 1978).
78. See R. LAPP, THE NEW PRIESTHOOD: THE SCIENTIFIC ELITE AND TIlE USES OF POWER (1965).
79. Compare H. BROWN, supra note 7, with E. MISIIAN, supra note 26. Mishan concludes at
265:
In the circumstances, only an extension of state power and a diminution of personal
freedoms will prevent a disintegration into social chaos. And this process . .. is under
way. The growing fears today of violence, terrorism and urban disruption, the public's
apprehension of the grave threats posed by the new technology, and the intensification of
group conflicts within our "pluralistic" societies-all of these untoward features, tracea-
ble . . . to the technological revolution of the past century, have weakened popular
resistance to the assumption of wider powers of control by modern governments. Aninstinct
for survival is impelling the Western democracies along the road to the totalitarian state.
Dr. Brown is not so despairing
I am by no means without hope-if I were, "I would not have written this book. ... In
short, I believe that although the dangers which confront us are immense, we nevertheless
have it in our power to create a new level of civilization-an abundant, just, and peaceful
world in which people can not only develope to their fullest terrestrial potential-they can
reach out to the stars as well.
H. BROWN, supra note 7, at 10-1I.
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